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ESSAY




The last decade has been a remarkable one for statutory interpretation.
For most of our history, American judges have been pragmatists when it
comes to interpreting statutes.' They have drawn on various conven-
tions-the plain meaning rule, legislative history, considerations of statutory
purpose, canons of construction--"much as a golfer selects the proper club
when he gauges the distance to the pin and the contours of the course."2
The arrival of Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court has changed this.
Justice Scalia is a foundationalist, insisting that certain interpretational tools
should be permanently banned from judicial use. What is more, Justice
Scalia is sufficiently committed to his views about legal method that he
often declines to join other Justice's opinions that employ improper
methods. This unyielding stance, reinforced by the appointment of Justice
Thomas, who appears to share similar convictions, is producing a major
transformation in the way the Supreme Court approaches statutory
interpretation cases.
The two foundationalist positions with which Justice Scalia is most
closely associated are textualism and the Chevron doctrine. Textualism is
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. An earlier draft
of this Essay was presented to the Administrative Law Section of the 1994 Association of American
Law Schools Meeting on January 9, 1994. The research assistance of William Stuckwisch is gratefully
acknowledged, as are the comments by Gary Lawson and Peter Strauss. Research support was provided
by the Class of 1940 Research Professorship.
I. See generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TFX. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (collecting diverse sources of authority relied upon
by the Supreme Court in interpreting statutes); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (arguing that no foundationalist
theory can account for the Court's statutory interpretation cases).
2. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOwA L. REv. 195, 215-16 (1983).
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not simply a revival of the old plain meaning rule. It is a sophisticated
theory of interpretation which readily acknowledges that the meaning of
words depends on the context in which they are used. The critical
assumption is that interpretation should be objective rather than subjective;
that is, the judge should ask what the ordinary reader of a statute would
have understood the words to mean at the time of enactment, not what the
intentions of the enacting legislators were.4  In practical terms, the
principal implication of this ordinary reader perspective is to banish
virtually all consideration of legislative history from statutory interpretation.
The Chevron doctrine5 is a narrower precept that concerns when courts
should defer to interpretations of statutes by administrative agencies. In
contrast to the older pragmatic tradition that emphasized a variety of
contextual factors in deciding when and to what extent deference is
appropriate,6 Chevron posits that a two-step inquiry is required in every
case. At step one, the court undertakes an independent examination of the
question. If it concludes the meaning of the statute is clear, that ends the
matter. But if the court concludes that the statute is ambiguous, then it
moves on to step two, under which it must defer to any interpretation by
a responsible administrative agency that the court finds to be reasonable.
Although Chevron itself was decided before Justice Scaliajoined the Court,
he has long been perceived as the Court's most enthusiastic partisan of the
two-step method associated with the decision.7
Both textualism and the Chevron doctrine have produced an outpouring
of commentary.' However, relatively little attention has been given to the
3. See Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050,2060-61 (1993) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting that
it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning
of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used");
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61, 61 (1994).
4. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 20-26 (1989).
5. So named for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
6. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 562 n.95 (1985).
7. See Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalla, 12
CARDOZO L. REv. 1663, 1663 (1991) ("Justice Scalia is a fierce, sometimes strident defender of
Chevron').
8. On textualism, see, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History In Interpreting




relationship between these two foundationalist positions.9 In one sense
textualism and Chevron seem like natural allies, "because both are at least
presented as doctrines of judicial restraint that limit judicial policy-
making."' Beneath this surface compatibility, however, lurks consider-
able tension.
One rather obvious problem is that Chevron was decided during the pre-
textualist era when legislative history was routinely considered by all
Justices. The decision describes step one in terms of a search for the
"intentions" of the legislature" and examines legislative history in an
effort to discover these intentions.12 At a minimum, therefore, a commit-
ted textualist must reformulate the two-step inquiry to purge it of these
intentionalist elements.
A less obvious but more fundamental problem is that Chevron is based
on a model of courts as faithful agents-faithful agents first of the
legislature, but when no instructions from the legislature can be discerned,
then faithful agents of administrative decisionmakers. 3 Textualism, in
contrast, rejects the faithful agent model and instead adopts a model of
courts as autonomous interpreters who seek answers to questions of
statutory meaning through application of the ordinary reader perspective,
supplemented by various judge-made rules of interpretation. Once courts
embrace this autonomous interpreter model when dealing with legislative
branch materials, it may be difficult to shift gears and assume the posture
of the faithful agent when dealing with executive branch agencies.
This Essay offers a preliminary assessment of how textualism and the
REV. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV. 423 (1988); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique ofJustice Scalia's Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231.
On Chevron, see, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-
Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron,
90 COLUM. L. RE,. 2071 (1990).
9. An important exception is Herz, supra note 7.
10. Herz, supra note 7, at 1677. As Justice Scalia has noted: "In my experience, there is a fairly
close correlation between the degree to which a person is (for want of a better word) a 'strict
constructionist' of statutes, and the degree to which that person favors Chevron and is willing to give
it broad scope." Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 521.
1I. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
12. Id. at 851-53, 862-64.
13. For fuller treatment of this point, see Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Prisoner's Dilemma,
and the Behavior of the Independent Judiciary, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 396, 399 (1993).
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Chevron doctrine are faring together in the Supreme Court. Part II tracks
the progress of these two tenets in recent terms of the Supreme Court.
Textualism is clearly ascendant. The use of legislative history (a disfavored
tool among textualists) is dropping precipitously, while the use of
dictionaries (a favored tool) is moving up. The Chevron doctrine, in
contrast, is not flourishing. Although the Court tends to identify the
deference doctrine more closely with Chevron than ever before, deference
to agency interpretations appears to be playing a smaller role overall than
had been the norm up through the end of the 1980s. Thus, the general
pattern in the Court appears to suggest something of an inverse relationship
between textualism and use of the Chevron doctrine.
In Part III, I consider some possible explanations for these trends.
Justice Scalia's own explanation, which suggests a basic harmony between
textualism and Chevron, is straightforward: textualism is a more objective
method of interpretation than intentionalism, and thus generates less
"agency-liberating ambiguity" that requires courts to move beyond step
one.'4 The empirical basis for this claim, however, is doubtful. I will
suggest two alternative explanations. One, which is short term, focuses on
the competition within the Court between the textualists (led by Justice
Scalia) and the intentionalists (led by Justice Stevens). As long as each of
these rival groups seeks to persuade swing Justices that its preferred
method is more restraining of judges than the other method, each group has
an incentive to avoid the conclusion that any given statute is ambiguous,
and thus that deference to agency interpretations is appropriate. The second
explanation, which is longer term, focuses on the style of interpretation
associated with textualism. Textualism tends to approach problems of
statutory interpretation like a puzzle, the answer to which is found by
developing the most persuasive account of all the public sources (dictionar-
ies, other provisions of the statute, other statutes) that bear on ordinary
meaning. This in turn tends to make statutory interpretation an exercise in
ingenuity-an attitude that may be less conducive to deference to the
decisions of other institutions than the dry archival approach associated
with intentionalism.
Under either explanation, textualism poses a threat to the future of the
deference doctrine. For those who believe that judicial deference to agency
interpretations of law is a good thing, this should be a cause for concern,
and provides some reason to question the wisdom of textualism, or at least




the way the deference doctrine is currently implemented through the
Chevron doctrine.
II. TEXTUALISM AND CHEVRON IN RECENT TERMS OF THE
SUPREME COURT
By far the most important story from the Supreme Court on the statutory
interpretation front these days is the emergence of the textualist method
associated with Justice Scalia. As is well known, since his arrival on the
Court Justice Scalia has campaigned assiduously for the elimination of
legislative history from the Court's statutory interpretation opinions. 5 At
first this effort seemed quixotic and appeared to have little impact on the
other Justices. Over time, however, Justice Scalia's influence on this
question has grown, to the point where it now appears that he has achieved
a substantial measure of success.
Three data points may be used to demonstrate the march of textualism
in the Supreme Court. They are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Textualism in the Supreme Court, 1981-1992
Cases making Cases Not
Total Statutory Substantive Mentioning Cases Relying
Interpretation Use of Legis- Legislative o
Term Cases lative Hist. History
1981 69 69(100%) 0(0%) 1(1%)
1988 71 53(75%) 10(14%) 9(13%)
1992 66 12(18%) 41(62%) 22(33%)
The data on use of legislative history in the 1981 and 1988 Terms have
been borrowed from law review articles published by Judge Patricia Wald.
Her first article 6 included a survey of the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation decisions in the 1981 Term. She reported that although the
Court made frequent use of the "plain meaning" rule. in practice the rule
had been "laid to rest."' 7 In what today seems a truly remarkable finding,
she uncovered no case in the 1981 Term in which the Court did not refer
to legislative history in a substantive way in determining the meaning of a
15. The emergence of Justice Scalia's views is described in Eskridge, supra note 8.
16. Wald, supra note 2.
17. Wald, supra note 2, at 195.
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federal statute. 8
Judge Wald later repeated this analysis for the 1988 Term.'9 She
reported that the textualists, in particular Justice Scalia and to a lesser
degree Justice Kennedy, had made some inroads. Legislative history was
still used in a substantive way in nearly three-fourths of the Court's
statutory interpretation opinions.2" But the controlling opinion in ten
statutory interpretation cases that Term made no reference to legislative
history. And even those opinions that referred to legislative history
appeared to do so with a "certain tone of caution."'"
The data for the most recent Term, 1992, are my own. The sixty-six
statutory interpretation cases I identified in the last Term reveal that what
was at most an emerging trend in 1988 has become a major transformation.
In over forty decisions, there is no reference to legislative history by any
of the participating Justices. Indeed, adopting even the most generous
construction of Judge Wald's criterion for inclusion,22 only thirteen
decisions from the 1992 Term can be said to include any "substantive use"
of legislative history by the majority or plurality opinion. In short, in
slightly more than a decade the Court has moved from a position in which
legislative history was routinely considered in all cases, to a situation in
which it is considered by the controlling opinion in only a small minority
of decisions. And in most cases, it is not mentioned at all.
To corroborate the trend suggested by the decline in use of legislative
history, I also examined the frequency of the Court's use of dictionary
definitions in resolving issues of statutory interpretation. Dictionary
definitions are by no means the only tool of textualism, nor are they limited
18. Id. at 195, 197.
19. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990).
20. Id. at 288.
21. Id. at 309.
22. I included every case in which the controlling opinion (majority or plurality) employed
legislative history in some nontrivial way to advance the legal argument. For example, citation to a
committee report for a definition of a word used in the statute was enough to merit inclusion. See
United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2019-20 (1993). Also included were cases
in which legislative history is referred to in the text only to be rejected. See United States Dep't of
Treasury v. Fabe, 113 S. Ct. 2202, 2210-11 (1993). I excluded cases that cited legislative history for
noncontroversial propositions, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884, 889 (1993)
(citing legislative history of Sherman Act for proposition that antitrust law is developed by courts on
a case-by-case basis), or simply as illustration, e.g., Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Associated Builders, 113 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 (1993), or that rejected the relevance of legislative history




to the textualist method. But it is probably fair to say that the textualist
method, with its search for the ordinary meaning ascribed to words by the
contemporaneous reader, probably leads to the dictionary more often than
does the approach that frames the inquiry in terms of legislative intent.'
Here too we find a remarkable corroboration of the rise of textualism.
In the 1981 Term, only one majority opinion referred to a dictionary in
resolving a question of statutory interpretation. The number had grown to
nine by the 1988 Term (13% of statutory interpretation opinions) and
jumped to twenty-two (33% of all statutory interpretation opinions) in the
most recent Term. Thus, the dramatic decline in the use of legislative
history from 1981 to 1992 finds as its almost perfect mirror image a rise
in the use of dictionaries.
Taking both pieces of evidence together, there can be no doubt that
textualism has asserted a powerful hold over the Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation jurisprudence. To be sure, the transformation is far from
complete. Justice Stevens in particular has emerged in recent Terms as a
forceful defender of the search for legislative intent and the use of
legislative history. 4 But there can be no doubt that textualism is in
ascendancy and the use of legislative history to discover congressional
intent is very much on the decline.
What then has been the impact of the textualist revolution on Chevron
and the deference doctrine? One would naturally expect some kind of
impact. The Chevron opinion speaks the language of legislative intent'
and was authored by Justice Stevens, the last true-blue holdout in favor of
intentionalism and legislative history in statutory interpretation. Moreover,
Chevron itself carefully canvassed the legislative history of the Clean Air
Act before concluding that Congress did not have an intent on the issue
before the Court.26 At a minimum, therefore, one would expect that the
Court's formulation of the Chevron doctrine would have to change.
It appears that this has indeed happened. The Court's most recent
comprehensive restatement of the Chevron doctrine reads as follows:
If the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain language of the
statute, deference is due. In ascertaining whether the agency's interpretation
is a permissible construction of the language, a court must look to the
23. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994).
24. See Popkin, supra note 8.
25. 467 U.S. at 845.
26. Id. at 851-53, 862-64.
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structure and language of the statute as a whole. If the text is ambiguous and
so open to interpretation in some respects, a degree of deference is granted
to the agency, though a reviewing court need not accept an interpretation
which is unreasonable.27
This reformulation is obviously designed to make step one of the Chevron
doctrine a purely textualist inquiry. No consideration of legislative history
or of the "intent" of Congress is mentioned. "Plain language," "structure
and language," and "the text" are all that count. It remains to be seen
whether one should read any significance into the use of the phrase "a
degree of deference" to describe the consequences of finding ambiguity at
step one."8
Beyond the reformulation of the doctrine, the more important question
is whether textualism is having an impact on the frequency with which the
Court invokes the deference doctrine or decides to defer to agency
constructions of law. To assess this question, I expanded upon a survey I
published in 1992.29 The object of the earlier survey was to assess the
impact of the Chevron decision on the Court's own jurisprudence of
deference. Some lower courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, had treated
Chevron like the magna carta of deference, mandating greater respect for
administrative interpretations than had theretofore been the case.30 I was
curious to see whether the Supreme Court regarded it the same way, and
to this end surveyed all the Court's decisions involving a deference
27. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1401-02 (1992)
(citations omitted).
28. Other than this reformulation, which was foreshadowed in earlier cases, see K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,291 (1988), there are few significant developments in the Chevron doctrine
to report on in the last two years. The above noted decision in Boston & Maine Corp. also breaks new
ground in holding that Chevron deference should be given to an interpretation that is a "necessary
presupposition" of an agency decision, even if the agency did not make this interpretation explicit. 112
S. Ct. at 1402-03. And a case from the 1992 Term, Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151,
2159-62 (1993), contains an unusually elaborate discussion of three pre-Chevron contextual factors
(contemporaneous interpretation, consistent interpretation, and delegated rulemaking authority), and tries
(without any notable success) to integrate them into the Chevron framework. Finally, Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), confirms a point first advanced in Maislin Indus., U.S. v. Primary
Steel, Inc., 497 U.S., Inc. 116, 131 (1990)-that in determining whether a statute is ambiguous for
Chevron purposes a court must treat prior Supreme Court constructions of the statute as part of the
statute itself. 112 S. Ct. at 847-48. In other words, prior Supreme Court interpretations trump
administrative interpretations. This important point obviously constricts significantly the possible scope
of the Chevron doctrine.
29. Thomas w. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
30. For empirical support for this perception, see Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the




question from the 1981 Term through the 1990 Term. Table 2 below is
adapted from the earlier study.
Table 2. Deference Decisions in the Supreme Court, 1984-1990 Terms
A B C D E F
Chevron Chevron
Total Frame- Frame- Cases
Cases In- Chevron work: work: Citing
volving Agency Frame- Agency Decided Tradi-
Deference View work View at Step tional
Term Question Accepted Applied Accepted Two Factors
1981 11 10(90%) N/A N/A N/A 8(73%)
1982 15 11(73%) N/A N/A N/A 11(73%)
1983 19 13(68%) N/A N/A N/A 11(57%)
Total
1981- 45 34(75%) N/A N/A N/A 30(66%)
1983
1984 19 18(94%) 1(5%) 1(100%) 1(100%) 7(37%)
1985 14 11(78%) 6(43%) 5( 83%) 4(66%) 6(43%)
1986 9 5(55%) 2(22%) 1(50%) 1(50%) 2(22%)
1987 14 9(64%) 5(36%) 3(60%) 3(60%) 3(21%)
1988 9 4(44%) 3(33%) 1( 33%) 1(33%) 6(66%)
1989 14 8(57%) 9(64%) 4(44%) 2(22%) 4(29%)
1990 11 8(73%) 6(55%) 4(66%) 2(33%) 6(55%)
Total
1984- 90 63(70%) 32(36%) 19(59%) 14(44%) 34(37%)
1990
The most general finding of the survey was that Chevron had not made a
dramatic difference in the frequency with which the Supreme Court
deferred to agency interpretations of statutes. If anything, the number of
deference cases and the rate at which the Supreme Court accepted the
agency view went down somewhat after Chevron was decided (columns A
and B). Indeed, I found that the Court applied the Chevron framework to
less than half the cases that presented a question of deference (column C),
although the frequency started to rise in the 1989 and 1990 Terms.
Perhaps the most counterintuitive finding of the survey was that in the
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cases in which the Court did apply the two-step Chevron approach, the
Court was somewhat less likely to defer to agency views than in cases in
which the Court did not invoke the Chevron standard (compare columns D
and B). Most lower courts and commentators have assumed that the
Chevron framework was designed to, and if faithfully applied would, result
in a greater degree of deference to agency interpretations of statutes.3'
Table 3 reports the same results for the two most recent Terms.
Table 3. Deference Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1991-1992 Terms
A B C D E F
Chevron Chevron
Frame- Frame- Cases
Total Cases Chevron work: work: Citing
Involving Agency Frame- Agency Decided Tradi-
Deference View work View at Step tional
Term Question Accepted Applied Accepted Two Factors
1992 8 6(75%) 3(37%) 3(100%) 2(66%) 1(13%)
1991 8 6(75%) 6(75%) 4(66%) 3(50%) 4(50%)
Total
1991- 16 12(75%) 9(56%) 7(77%) 5(55%) 5(31%)
1992
At first blush, the last two Terms appear to be more-or-less business as
usual on the Chevron front. Comparing the data from the two tables, we
see that the overall rate of acceptance of agency interpretations in the last
two years (column B) is up slightly (to 75%), but this is not too far out of
line with the general average during the post-Chevron period (70%). And
31. I sought to explain these results on the basis of various perceived jurisprudential failings of
the Chevron doctrine: Chevron tends to make deference an all or nothing proposition, whereas the Court
is more likely to want a sliding scale; Chevron adopts a sequential inquiry that either overemphasizes
judicial inputs or overemphasizes administrative inputs, whereas the Court is likely to prefer a blending
of the two; Chevron makes it difficult in some cases for the Court to perform an effective job of
policing overreaching or other abuses of power by the executive, whereas the Court is likely to regard
this as a key function of judicial review; and Chevron makes traditional contextual factors that have
guided courts-such as whether the agency interpretation is longstanding, contemporaneous with
enactment of the statute, well reasoned, or the product of an express delegation of rulemaking
authority-largely irrelevant, whereas the Court is likely to want to continue to rely on these factors
in appropriate cases. Merrill, supra note 29, at 993-1003. In other words, the suggestion was that
Chevron is a kind of jurisprudential straightjacket that the Court itself is not likely to don very often,
lest the expectation arise that it is compulsory attire.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/6
THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE
the percentage of deference cases that employ the Chevron framework
(column C) is roughly consistent with the trend that started around 1988,
after Chevron took on greater visibility within the Court.32
The aggregate data nevertheless suggest several possible divergences
from the earlier period. Given the small sample size, any inference of
change must necessarily be cautious and preliminary. Still, there appears
to be a slightly increased tendency to affirm the agency interpretation in
cases in which Chevron is applied (column D). Here the rate goes from
50% in the 1988-90 period to 77% in the two most recent years. In
addition, there appears to be a slightly increased tendency, again in the
cases applying Chevron, to affirm on the ground that the agency interpreta-
tion is reasonable (step two), as opposed to finding that the agency
interpretation is compelled by the meaning of the statute (step one) (column
E). The number of step two cases increased from 30% in the 1988-90
period to 55% in the most recent two year period. Standing alone both of
these trends would tend to disconfirm a prediction I made in my previous
article, to the effect that Chevron was turning into a doctrine of
antideference.33
On the other hand, it also appears that the number of deference cases
decided in each of the last two Terms (column A) is down somewhat from
the previous period.34 Although the total number of cases decided by the
Court is also down, when we look at deference cases as a percentage of all
statutory interpretation cases we nevertheless find that a decline in the
invocation of the deference doctrine appears to be taking place.35 When
we move beyond the aggregate data to examine individual cases, moreover,
an even more dramatic falloff appears. To some degree in the 1991 Term,
but much more noticeably in the 1992 Term, the deference doctrine appears
to be playing an increasingly peripheral role in the decisions even when it
is mentioned.
Specifically, of the total of eight deference cases that I identified in the
1992 Term, four mentioned the possibility of deference in a footnote or in
32. During the 1988-90 Terms, the Court applied Chevron in 51% of its deference cases, and
accepted the agency view in 50% of the cases in which Chevron was applied. Merrill, supra note 29,
at 992.
33. Merrill, supra note 29, at 1002.
34. The average number of deference cases in the first 7 post-Chevron years was 12.85.
35. Looking at only the three Terms for which I have figures for the total number of statutory
interpretation cases, we find that the deference doctrine was raised in 16% of all statutory cases in the
1981 Term, in 13% of all statutory cases in the 1988 Term, and in 12% of all statutory cases in the
1992 Term.
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passing, only to say that it was not necessary to reach it.36 In a fifth case,
the doctrine was mentioned by the dissent in passing, but not alluded to at
all in the majority opinion.3' And in a sixth case, the doctrine was used
to resolve only a subsidiary issue.3 ' Thus, a closer examination of the
opinions on deference from the 1992 Term reveals that there were in fact
only two decisions that turned in any significant degree on the deference
doctrine. This is a dramatic reduction in the incidence of the use of the
doctrine relative to what we have witnessed throughout most of the modem
era.
This trend toward marginalization of the deference doctrine, if it persists,
largely negates any inferences that might be drawn from the aggregate data
suggesting a turn toward greater use of the Chevron doctrine and a more
deferential use of that doctrine. Indeed, what we may be witnessing is a
kind of extension of a trend that emerged in the 1989 to 1990 period, when
the Court began applying the Chevron doctrine more frequently, but also
tended to resolve most cases at step one. The currently fashionable
approach, which is functionally no different, is for the Court to exercise
independent judgment, find that the statutory meaning is unambiguous, and
then drop a footnote indicating that there is no need to consider deference
to agency views. If this conjecture is correct, then what appears from the
aggregate data to be a shift toward greater deference is largely an illusion.
There is, however, an important symbolic difference between applying
Chevron and resolving the case at step one, and resolving the case based
on independent judgment and not reaching the Chevron inquiry. A Court
that frames its inquiry in terms of the Chevron doctrine acknowledges in
effect that a major issue in the case is the choice of the appropriate
interpretative institution-the agency or the court. Every statutory
interpretation case becomes a separation of powers case. In contrast, a
Court that resolves the issue itself and then drops a footnote saying it is not
necessary to consider the deference doctrine says in effect that deference
to the agency is just another pair of pliers in the statutory interpretation tool
chest. Deference on this view raises no separation of powers question, but
is analogous to selecting a canon of interpretation to resolve an issue
36. United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2186 n.11
(1993); South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993); Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2006, 2013 n.3 (1993); Moreau v. Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. 1905, 1912 (1993); Bath
Iron Works v. Director, OWCP, 113 S. Ct. 692, 700 (1993).
37. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).




otherwise too close to call.39
At any event, the apparent marginalization of the deference doctrine in
the last Term means that it is still not possible to say that Chevron has had
any lasting impact on the Supreme Court, at least in terms of pressing the
Court toward greater deference to agency views. It also means it is
premature to reject my earlier prediction that the deficiencies in the
Chevron doctrine may lead to less rather than more deference by the
Supreme Court. The Court can avoid deferring to agency views by
ignoring the Chevron doctrine or by expanding the scope of judicial inquiry
at step one. But it can also avoid deferring to agencies by relegating
Chevron to a footnote.
III. SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
The previous Part showed that textualism is clearly ascendent in the
Supreme Court, and suggested, albeit more tentatively, that Chevron may
be on the wane. In this Part, I will consider some possible explanations for
these developments.
A. The Rise of Textualism
The rapid spread of textualism among the Justices no doubt owes
something to Justice Scalia's powers of persuasion. Since 1987, Justice
Scalia has been conducting what amounts to a continuous seminar on the
virtues of textualism and evils of legislative history. During this time, he
has authored nearly twenty controlling opinions for the Court which
demonstrate his textualist method in action. Perhaps more importantly, he
has authored almost twice as many separate concurring or dissenting
opinions that chastise other Justices for straying from the proper path. The
fact that some of the more recently appointed (Republican) Justices have
been receptive to these views, especially Justice Thomas and to a lesser
degree Justice Kennedy, is a sign that Justice Scalia's arguments have
persuaded at least some of the other Justices.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the spread of textualism does
not reflect anything like a genuine conversion by most of the other Justices.
First, Justice Scalia's separate opinions have occasionally elicited responses
directly challenging his views. For example, in Wisconsin Public
39. For a defense of the idea that the Chevron doctrine should be understood as a canon of
interpretation, see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 2113.
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Intervenor v. Mortier,0 Justice White's opinion for the Court responded
to a Scalia concurring opinion with a brief defense of using legislative
history in a "good faith effort to discern legislative intent."4' Justice
White concluded that "the Court's practice of utilizing legislative history
reaches well into its past" and "[w]e suspect that the practice will likewise
reach well into the future. '42 All seven other Justices joined this footnote,
including Justice Kennedy (Justice Thomas was not yet on the Court).
Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,43 Justice Scalia
upbraided Justice Souter (writing for a plurality of three, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor) for using legislative history, the
"St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction." '  Souter breezily
responded that "[tihe shrine ... is well peopled (though it has room for
one more) and its congregation has included such noted elders as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter . . . ."' These exchanges suggest that, with the
exception of Justice Thomas, no one else on the Court is prepared to
endorse Justice Scalia's unbending views.
Second, it is highly unlikely that Justices whose careers on the bench
predate 1987-and who therefore have made profligate use of legislative
history in their past decisions-are likely to endorse a position that
impeaches their own past practice. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for example,
has long been a proponent of judicial deference to legislatures4 6 and has
fairly consistently portrayed the proper role of the courts in statutory
interpretation cases as that of the faithful agent seeking out the intentions
of the enacting legislature.47 Not surprisingly, he has been lavish in his
use of legislative history.41 Indeed, although he is clearly bending with
the textualist wind, Chief Justice Rehnquist continues to show no
compunctions about using legislative history when an appropriate occasion
40. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).
41. Id. at 2485 n.4.
42. Id.
43. 112 S. Ct. 2102 (1992).
44. Id. at 2111 (Scalia, J. joined by Thomas J., concurring in the judgment).
45. Id. at 2109 n.8.
46. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693
(1976).
47. See Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 RuT.-CAM. L.. (forthcoming).
48. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686-94 (1983); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 66 (1983) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681-87 (1979);




arises to make reference to it.49
A better explanation for the triumph of textualism, in my opinion, lies
not so much in Justice Scalia's persuasiveness as in his persistence. The
critical factor here is Justice Scalia's practice of refusing to join any part
of another Justice's opinion that relies on legislative history. This means
that in any case in which another Justice needs the vote of Justice Scalia
to form a majority or controlling opinion, the writing Justice knows that if
legislative history is employed he or she will lose majority status with
respect to at least a portion of the opinion. The arrival of Justice Thomas,
who has taken up a similar stance, effectively doubles Justice Scalia's
voting clout in this regard.
On the other side of the ledger, the defenders of legislative history, most
prominently Justice Stevens but to a lesser extent all of the other Justices,
have adopted no such irredentist stance. Specifically, neither Justice
Stevens nor any other Justice has adopted a policy of declining to join any
opinion that fails to ground statutory interpretation in a conception of
legislative purpose derived from legislative history. The simple logic of
coalition building thus points powerfully toward suppression of legislative
history: two sure votes lost if you use it, no votes necessarily lost if you
ignore it.
In short, the internal dynamic on the Court is such that each Justice now
has an incentive to abandon all references to legislative history in his or her
opinions, at least if the Justice has any hope of attracting the votes of
Justices Scalia and Thomas. The result is that the remaining Justices-all
of whom have from time to time endorsed the use of legislative histo-
ry-now regularly produce textualist opinions that look very much like
those written in the workshops of Justices Scalia and Thomas. Moreover,
we can probably expect this pattern to persist as long as Justices Scalia and
Thomas maintain their current uncompromising stance-and as long as they
remain sufficiently close to the center of the Court that their votes remain
49. For example, in Negonsott v. Samuels, 113 S. Ct. 1119 (1993), Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
for a unanimous Court (and hence did not need the votes of Justices Scalia and Thomas). Although
he purported to find the language of the statute plain, Id. at 1123, in fact the language presented a
classic case in which one sentence of the Act appeared to conflict with another. Id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist went on to examine the legislative history, id. at 1123-25, which provided clear and
persuasive support for his conclusion that the first sentence rather than the second was controlling.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, as usual, did not join the discussion of legislative history, id. at 1120 n.**,
but did not file a dissent.
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important to other Justices in building coalitions."0
B. The Waning of Chevron
The more difficult question is why the rise in textualism may be
associated with a decline in use of the Chevron doctrine. The textualist in
chief, Justice Scalia, has supplied one explanation for this phenomenon.
As he wrote in an article on Chevron published in 1989:
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent
from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less
often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists. It is thus
relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an interpretation which,
though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who
abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning
of a statute to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently
find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of
"reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the courts
must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will require that
judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater."
In other words, Justice Scalia sees textualism as a doctrine of judicial
restraint, reducing the range of possible statutory meanings, and thus
reducing the occasions on which reference to agency views is appropriate.
In contrast, he sees intentionalism as increasing the range of possible
meanings because it allows "the apparent meaning of a statute to be
impeached by the legislative history." 2 Thus, intentionalism will generate
more "agency-liberating ambiguity" than will a consistent application of
textualism.'
Those who defend the use of legislative history would strenuously
dispute this analysis. They would point out that statutory language is often
50. It is interesting in this regard to contrast the position of Justices Scalia and Thomas with that
of Justices Brennan and Marshall with respect to the death penalty. Although the uncompromising
Brennan-Marshall stance on the death penalty no doubt shifted the pattern of outcomes in death penalty
cases toward a more liberal position, it did not appear to have any significant influence on the way
other Justices wrote opinions. The difference may be that the Brennan-Marshall position concerned
legal outcomes, while the Scalia-Thomas position on legislative history concerns legal method. One
can nearly always reach a given result in a statutory interpretation case either by ignoring or by
consulting legislative history. Thus, on the plausible assumption that the other Justices care mostly
about outcomes, they are willing to shade their legal method in the direction of the Scalia-Thomas
position on legislative history, but were not similarly inclined to move toward an accommodation with
the Brennan-Marshall position on the death penalty.
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vague or ambiguous and that it is often necessary to determine the purpose
of the statute in order to particularize the meaning or select between two
or more facially plausible meanings. 4 Textualism may afford no basis for
selecting between two competing meanings and will thus render the
outcome random or unpredictable. Intentionalism, in contrast, allows the
court to consult the legislative history for evidence of Congress' purposes,
and armed with this understanding, to select the meaning most consistent
with those purposes. Consequently, for the pragmatic or intentionalist
interpreter, consulting legislative history is the true doctrine of restraint and
is likely to reduce, not increase, the number of occasions when courts are
unable to identify a controlling congressional intention at step one of the
Chevron process. For the intentionalist, it is textualism-at least a
textualism honestly employed-that is more likely to generate "agency-
liberating ambiguity." Figure 1 attempts to illustrate the disagreement.
Figure 1. Competing Views of Legislative History
I I I I
I I I I
I I I I
1<- te xt- > I j< -text- >1
j< - leg. hist.-> j< -leg. hist ->1
Textualist (Scalia) View Intentionalist (Stevens) View
Obviously, legislative history can be used both to expand upon or limit
the range of meanings that the text alone will sustain. The question is
which effect dominates. The textualists believe that the range of meanings
permitted by the text alone is fairly narrow, and that admitting consider-
ations of legislative history will, on the whole, tend to expand the range of
possible meanings. The intentionalists, in contrast, believe that the text
alone will yield a fairly wide range of possible meanings; admit legislative
54. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 19, at 301-02; Breyer, supra note 8, at 856-61; Farber & Frickey,
supra note 8, at 457-58.
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history and the range of possible meanings narrows.
This dispute over whether the use of legislative history expands or
narrows the range of permissible meanings presents an empirical question
that, at least in principle, should be testable. To be sure, determining the
overall impact of legislative history is difficult today, because the Court
often does not tell us what the legislative history contains. It would be a
herculean task to perform a legislative history analysis for all the cases in
which the Court says nothing about it (even with the aid of the briefs of the
parties, which in most cases no doubt still contain discussions of legislative
history). Nevertheless, there is at least some available evidence that tends
to cast doubt on Justice Scalia's assertion that the predominant effect of
legislative history is "to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be
impeached.""
The first is supplied by Judge Wald's article reporting the results of a
detailed survey of the Supreme Court's use of legislative history in the
1988 Term. 6 After reviewing all the Court's statutory construction
opinions that year, she concluded that in only five cases "did the Court use
legislative materials to come to a different result from that derived from the
arguably 'plain' language of the statute."57 In contrast, in thirty-two cases
the Court found that the text of the law was silent or ambiguous on the
issue in question, and "[i]n eight of these cases, legislative history was able
to shed some light on the particular issue for decision.""8 In the remain-
ing eighteen cases, the Court used legislative history "to confirm its reading
of statutory language."59 Although this analysis casts serious doubt on the
utility of legislative history-whether its benefits are worth its costs6 -- it
55. Scalia, supra note 10, at 521.
56. Wald, supra note 19.
57. Id. at 294.
58. Id. at 292.
59. Id. at 289. Note that Judge Wald's numbers do not add up. She reported a total number of
fifty-three cases that considered legislative history in the 1988 Term, but her three categories (five cases,
thirty-two cases, and eighteen cases) add up to fifty-five. The discrepancy is not explained.
60. In terms of Judge Wald's survey, the question whether the benefits from using legislative
history are worth the added costs to the courts and the parties would depend in part on one's attitude
toward the five cases in which legislative history was used to modify the outcome suggested by the text.
If these cases are regarded as properly decided (the position a pure intentionalist would presumably
take), then legislative history had a positive payoff in thirteen cases and added nothing (except perhaps
a comfort factor) in forty-two. If one regards these five cases as wrongly decided (the position required
by the classic statement of the plain meaning rule), then legislative history had a positive payoff in eight
cases, a negative effect in five cases, and added nothing in forty-two. If one adopts this latter view,
it may well be that legislative history could be condemned solely on the ground that the benefits are




hardly supports the textualist claim that the dominant role of legislative
history is to expand the range of permissible readings of a statute."
Expansion occurred in less than 10% of the cases using legislative history;
in the remaining cases legislative history either narrowed the range of
possible meaning or added nothing. 2
A second source of evidence would be to look at the type of statutory
interpretation questions presented to the Court for decision in each case.
Justice Scalia's view that legislative history "permit[s] the apparent
meaning of a statute to be impeached" suggests that the dominant type of
question is one in which the result produced by the ordinary meaning is
challenged as overly broad or overly narrow relative to the purposes of the
law, or in which the language is said to result in an absurd outcome or to
reflect a drafting error. These are circumstances in which legislative
history might be used to "impeach" the ordinary meaning, and hence
expand the range of permissible outcomes. The competing intentionalist
view suggests that the dominant type of question is one in which the
ordinary meaning is ambiguous, i.e., admits of two or more possible
meanings, is vague, contains a gap, or conflicts with another provision of
the statute. These are the types of questions in which legislative history
would be expected to narrow the possible range of meanings.
I have collected preliminary data designed to determine the relative
frequency of these issues.63 The data suggest that roughly 50% of the
Supreme Court's statutory interpretation cases concern questions about the
61. It would have been even more illuminating had Judge Wald broken down the cases from the
1981 Term into similar categories. Recall that the Supreme Court considered legislative history in every
single statutory interpretation case that year. Thus, the 1981 Term in effect offers up a laboratory
experiment on what effect legislative history would have if it were systematically considered in every
case. Although Judge Wald reported generally of the cases that Term that "legislative history is rarely
the determinative factor in statutory construction," Wald, supra note 2, at 195, it is not possible to tell
from her discussion how frequently legislative history was used to trump the apparent plain meaning
of the text. See also Wald, supra note 2, at 216.
62. William Eskridge provides confirmation of this in The New Textualism. He reports that in the
1988 Term, the 1987 Term, and the 1986 Term, the Court used legislative history to get around
"apparent meaning" only four, three, and seven times, respectively. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 657.
63. The figures in the text are derived from an analysis done by my research assistant of all
Supreme Court statutory interpretation opinions from four Terms, 1981, 1982, 1991 and 1992-that is,
two from the legislative history era and two from the current textualist era. There are no major shifts
in the percentages from one period to the next, suggesting that the relative magnitudes are probably
reasonably accurate. For another source suggesting that a large number of the Courts statutory
interpretation decisions involve questions of ambiguity, see Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of
Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 123 (1992).
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proper construction of past precedent and the like, and thus do fit neatly
into either category. Of the remaining cases, roughly 40% involve
questions of ambiguity, vagueness, gaps, or internal conflict, and roughly
10% involve claims that the statutory language yields results that are overly
broad or overly narrow relative to the statute's purpose, or produces an
absurdity or is the product of mistake. If this breakdown of the types of
statutory interpretation questions that arise is even roughly accurate, then
again it is difficult to endorse the claim that the dominant effect of
legislative history is to expand, rather than to narrow, the range of possible
meanings.
In short, Justice Scalia's explanation for why the rise of textualism would
produce a decline in Chevron deference-that textualism constrains judicial
discretion and hence reduces the number of occasions when reference to
agency views is appropriate under step one-is at best unproven. For
alternative explanations, I will suggest two possibilities. One focuses on
short term dynamics within the Court, the other on longer term consequenc-
es associated with the style of textualist interpretation.
The short term explanation starts with the proposition that even if
textualism does not in fact constrain judicial discretion, Justices Scalia and
his allies very much want to persuade us that it does. In fact, if we view
the Court as currently divided into two camps engaged in a competitive
struggle over the use of legislative history, it is plausible that Justices in
both camps will strain to avoid deferring to agency interpretations of law
as long as that struggle continues.
The point can be made by referring again to Figure 1. The current
situation on the Court can be conceived of as one in which Justice Scalia
and his allies are anxious to persuade their colleagues and the wider legal
world that the left hand side of Figure 1 accurately depicts interpretative
reality. That is to say, that on the whole the texts of statutes and associated
conventions of ordinary meaning generate a fairly narrow range of
permissible outcomes, and that, again on the whole, the dominant effect of
adding legislative history to the mix is to expand the range of permissible
outcomes. On the other hand, Justice Stevens and his allies (which means
to some degree most of the other Justices), believe that on the whole the
right side of Figure 1 is a more accurate depiction of interpretative reality.
In other words, the text and ordinary meaning conventions generate a wide
range of permissible outcomes, and the introduction of legislative history
will, on the whole, constrain the range of permissible outcomes.
Absent definitive empirical proof that persuades either camp to abandon




Justices and the wider legal world that its vision of reality is the more
accurate one. Justice Scalia will want to demonstrate that textualism in fact
produces a narrower range of permissible meanings than does
intentionalism; Justice Stevens will try to demonstrate that intentionalism
generates a narrower range of permissible meanings than does textualism.
In these circumstances, a majority decision written from the perspective of
either camp to the effect that a statute is ambiguous and that deference to
agency interpretation is required is an open invitation to the other camp to
impeach the decision by showing that the alternative methodology would
not generate ambiguity. A textualist opinion finding ambiguity could be
impeached by an intentionalist dissent showing that there is no ambiguity
once the legislative history is considered; and an intentionalist opinion
finding ambiguity could be impeached by a textualist dissent showing that
if legislative history were excluded, the ambiguity goes away.
Obviously, I am not describing a process that necessarily manifests itself
on the surface of the cases, or that even influences many outcomes. But
even if such a competitive process operates at a subterranean level, it would
be enough to produce a perceptible shift in the frequency with which the
Court defers to agency interpretations. And it is plausible that something
very much like this competitive process is going on, at least from the
perspective of Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia has lectured widely' and has
written some forty separate concurring or dissenting opinions whose sole
purpose is to persuade his colleagues and the wider legal community to
abandon legislative history and embrace textualism. He has also publicly
announced that textualism, because of the greater constraints it imposes on
judges, should produce less deference to agency interpretations of law.6"
It would hardly be surprising that, whatever the validity of the assumptions
underlying these positions, Justice Scalia would be loath to expose his
positions too often to a contrary demonstration from a committed
intentionalist.
The warring camps hypothesis carries the implication that the eclipse of
the deference doctrine may be only a temporary phenomenon, and that if
textualism eventually becomes completely dominant (or is completely
vanquished) an equilibrium of deference will again be restored. But there
is another, more subtle explanation for why textualism and deference may
be inversely related-an explanation that suggests that textualism
64. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 650-51.
65. Scalia, supra note 10, at 521.
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triumphant would lead to a permanent subordination of the Chevron
doctrine.
This has to do with the style of judging associated with textualism.
Intentionalism mandates an "archeological" excavation of the past,66
producing opinions written in the style of the dry archivist sifting through
countless documents in search of the tell-tale smoking gun of congressional
intent. Textualism, in contrast, seems to transform statutory interpretation
into a kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The textualist judge treats
questions of interpretation like a puzzle to which it is assumed there is one
right answer. The task is to assemble the various pieces of linguistic data,
dictionary definitions, and canons into the best (most coherent, most
explanatory) account of the meaning of the statute. This exercise places a
great premium on cleverness. In one case the outcome turns on the
placement of a comma,' in another on the inconsistency between a
comma and rules of grammar," in a third on the conflict between
quotation marks and the language of the text.69 One day arguments must
be advanced in support of broad dictionary definitions; 0 the next day in
support of narrow dictionary definitions.' New canons of construction
and clear statement rules must be invented and old ones reinterpreted. 2
This active, creative approach to interpretation is subtly incompatible
with an attitude of deference toward other institutions-whether the other
institution is Congress or an administrative agency. In effect, the textualist
interpreter does notfind the meaning of the statute so much as construct
the meaning. Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty in
deferring to the meanings that other institutions have developed.
There are at least two reasons why textualism may lead to this more
creative, less deferential style of judging. One was alluded to in the
introduction: textualism implicitly rejects the faithful agent model of
66. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21
(1988).
67. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
68. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 170 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 113 S. Ct. 2173,2182-85 (1993).
70. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992).
71. Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354,2372 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that ordinary
meaning of "representatives" does not include "judges").
72. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
921, 923 (1992) (noting increasing use of canons by the Supreme Court); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45





judging that underlies intentionalism. By changing the focus from what
Congress intended to what the ordinary reader would understand, textualism
adopts, at least implicitly, a model of the court as an autonomous
interpreter, applying its own judicially-prescribed conventions and canons
for understanding the code that Congress has built up over the years. Once
the Court grows comfortable with the autonomous interpreter model, its
creativity in matters of statutory interpretation begins to expand apace,
exemplified perhaps most clearly by the proliferating use of canons.
The second reason is that the textualist must become creative out of
necessity. To return one last time to Figure 1, if Justice Stevens and the
intentionalists are correct that interpretative reality looks more like the right
side of Figure 1-and there is at least some preliminary evidence to suggest
they are correct 73-then a Court that adopts the textualist method and
rejects legislative history necessarily has fewer tools at its disposal to
particularize the meaning of the text than was the case in the era of
legislative history. Having fewer tools to work with, the textualist-like
the painter working with a small pallet-necessarily has to become more
imaginative in resolving questions of statutory interpretation.
Whatever the explanation for the active, creative style associated with
textualism, it is fair to say that this attitude is out of sync with the Chevron
doctrine, based as it is on a generalized model of the courts as faithful
agents of the politically accountable branches of government. To the extent
this change in style explains what appears to be an inverse relationship
between the rise of textualism and the waning of Chevron, it suggests that
the eclipse of the deference doctrine is likely to last as long as textualism
remains dominant.
IV. CONCLUSION
I am not prepared to take sides on the large question whether the rise of
textualism in the Supreme Court (and soon by inevitable emulation, in the
lower courts) is to be celebrated or deplored. That question involves a
highly complex judgment implicating multiple variables that are difficult
to isolate and measure.74 To name just a few, in evaluating the choice
between textualism and intentionalism it would be necessary: (1) to
determine whether courts can ever interpret texts without attributing a
73. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
74. For some helpful beginnings in sorting out these variables, see Breyer, supra note 8; Farber
& Frickey, supra note 8, at 458-61; Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of
Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993).
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purpose to the authors of the text, and if so, how much the judicial process
will suffer if courts are cut off from discussing (but presumably not from
consulting) a primary source of data about legislative purpose; (2) to
determine whether legislative history can ever serve as a reliable guide to
congressional purpose, given its inevitable incompleteness and increasingly
voiced concerns that it is subject to manipulation by staff and interest
groups; (3) to determine whether the outcome of statutory interpretation
cases will become more or less predictable if courts do or do not rely on
legislative history; (4) to estimate the savings in administrative costs, both
to courts and parties, of eliminating the need to collect legislative history
materials while increasing reliance on other interpretational tools; (5) to
evaluate the incentive effects for Congress if it became generally under-
stood that courts will not rely on legislative history (for example, will
interest group efforts to manipulate the legislative process and staff
influence go down, or will statutes become longer and more complex?); and
(6) to consider whether the typical American judge (Justice Scalia is not
typical) is up to the task of engaging in the creative, puzzle-solving
exercise that the textualist method demands, or whether the plodding
archival approach is the most we can expect of most of our lower court
judges.
I am more certain that the practice of consulting and deferring to the
interpretations of executive agencies is generally desirable. As I have
argued elsewhere, "[t]he practice of deferring to executive interpretations
of statutes performs many valuable functions: it allows policy to be made
by actors who are politically accountable; it draws upon the specialized
knowledge of administrators; it injects an element of flexibility into
statutory interpretation; and it helps assure nationally uniform construc-
tions."'75 If the rise of textualism means the decline of the deference
doctrine, either in the short or the long run, then this alone is cause for
concern. It may suggest one reason to reject textualism. Or, as I have
urged at length on another occasion,76 it may suggest reason to abandon
the Chevron doctrine, and think of deference not in terms of a fictitious
command from Congress, but rather in terms of a system of interbranch
precedent. If the practice of deferring to agency precedent were assimilated
to the practice of following judicial precedent, the future of the deference
doctrine would no longer be bound up with the fate of textualism. Thus,
75. Merrill, supra note 29, at 1002.
76. Id. at 1003-31.
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whether the ultimate objective of interpretation is framed in terms of
ordinary meaning or legislative intent, the views of the responsible agency
would be considered in every case.
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APPENDIX
Agency Deference Cases in the Supreme Court
1991-1992 Terms
Agency Chevron Step I
Case Interpretation Framework or Traditional
Accepted? Followed? Step 2 Factors
1992 Term
1. Good Samaritan Hosp. Longstanding
v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. Y Y Step 2 Contemporaneous
2151 (1993). Legis./Interp.
2. United States Nat'l
Bank of Oregon v.
Independent Ins. Agents Y Y Step 1 None
of Am., 113 S. Ct. 2173
(1993).
3. South Dakota v.
Bourland, 113 S. Ct. N N N/A None
2309 (1993).
4. CIR v. Keystone
Consol. Indus., Inc., 113 Y N N/A None
S. Ct. 2006 (1993).
5. Moreau v.
Klevenhagen, 113 S. Ct. Y N N/A None
1905 (1993).,
6. Newark v. Morning
Ledger Co., 113 S. Ct. N N N/A None
1670 (1993).
7. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Y N N/A None
Ct. 1439 (1993).
8. Reiter v. Cooper, 113 Y Y Step 2 None




Agency Deference Cases in the Supreme Court
1991-1992 Terms
Agency Chevron Step 1
Case Interpretation Framework or Traditional
Accepted? Followed? Step 2 Factors
1991 Term
9. Estate of Cowart v. Ratification
Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 Y Y Step 1 Latatin
S. Ct. 2589 (1992). Longstanding
10. United States v.
Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 Y N N/A Longstanding
(1992).
11. United States v. Alas-
ka, 112 S. Ct. 1606 Y Y Step 2 Longstanding
(1992).
12. National R.R. Pas-
senger Corp. v. Boston & Y Y Step 2 None
Maine Corp., 112 S. Ct.
1394 (1992).
13. Arkansas v. Oklaho-
ma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 Y Y Step 2 Well-reasoned
(1992).
14. Presley v. Etowah,
112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
15. Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 N Y Step 1 None
(1992).
16. Ardestani v. INS, 112 Y N N/A None
S. Ct. 515 (1991). 1
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